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THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT.
HON. JAmES G. JENKINS,
Formerly judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Judicial Circuit
In the year 1710, in the reign of Queen Anne, there was
passed by the English parliament for the first time an act for
the encouragement of learning, said to have been drafted by
Swift, whicli declared that an author should have for a limited
time the exclusive right of publishing his production, and enacted
certain penalties for the piracy of the work. For over sixty years
thereafter there was waged a most remarkable legal warfare be-
tween the jurists with respect to the character, nature and origin
of literary property; whether the right of property in literary
work existed at the common-law or by force only of the statute,
and whether if existing at the common-law, the right was taken
away or abridged by the statute in question. The courts of
chancery held with unanimity to the doctrine that independently
of legislation there was by the common-law the right of property
in the author of published works. In 1774, however, the House
of Lords by an equally divided court-that is to say, by a vote
of six to five of the Judges, Lord Mansfield, the twelfth judge,
through motives of delicacy declined to vote, because he had de-
cided the question in the King's bench-held to the doctrine that
any common-law right after publication had been taken away by
the statute of Anne, and that all rights of authors were to be
gauged by the provisions of that statute. Donaldson vs. Becket,
4 Burrows, 2498. That doctrine has since prevailed in England.
The nature of copyright, in this forensic battle, lasting over half
a century was, of course, most thoroughly considered and ably
discussed and was resolved into four antagonistio theories con-
cerning the nature of literary property.
First: That intellectual productions constitute a species of
property founded in natural law, recognized by the common-law,
not lost by publication, and not taken away by legislation.
Second: That an author by the common-law has the exclusive
right to control his -%Works before, but not after publication.
Third: That the right was not lost by publication, but was
destroyed by the statute.
Fourth: That copyright did not exist at common-law, was a
monopoly created and regulated by statute alone; and that no
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right other than that granted by the statute existed in the author.
The fundamental question-underlying and common to these
four conflicting theories-is whether the right to one's literary
production is a natural right to property covered by the same
general principles which underlie all property, or whether it is
an artificial right created by and subject to be destroyed by legis-
lative act.
It was urged in behalf of the natural right to literary pro-
duction that the origin of property by natural law rested upon
preoccupancy; although the writers on natural law differ in their
reasoning, some saying that this right by preoccupancy rested
upon social compact, a tacit or implied agreement that the first
occupant should become the owner. Others repudiate the idea of
social compact and declare the right to arise by the act of occu-
pancy alone, but all agreeing that in primitive ages he who first
occupied was entitled to hold, and that the act of occupancy gave
birth to ownership.
It was urged that preoccupancy being first possession, is given
by creation, by production; that he who creates is the first pos-
sessor of the thing created; that occupancy implied labor-for
example, that the taking and holding possession of unoccupied
lands at an early day was not possible without labor, and in later
times represented distance overcome, toils endured and dangers
passed; or, as Locke expresses the thought, the deer at large in
the forest, the fish swimming in the sea, are the common right of
all; but the law of reason gives the game to him who hath caught
it, who hath bestowed his labor upon it, who hath reduced it to
possession. The principle is as old as property itself that what a
man creates is his to enjoy to the exclusion of any other, and is
based upon the necessities of society and is essential to the pro-
motion of industry. Thus Abraham maintained his right to a well
because he had "digged this well" (Gen. XXI, 30); and over a
century later (assuming the correctness of time as stated) Isaac,
his son, successfully claimed the well as his father's property.
(Gen. XXVI, 18.)
In the highest state of the law title by production is the best
and strongest title. To him belongs the harvest whose toil has
produced it; to him the fruit who has planted the tree. This is
the natural mode of acquiring property. Succession, purchase,
gift, are derivative. In the one case property is obtained by the
sweat of the brow; in the other its acquisition is not inconsistent
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with idleness. In this sense it matters not whether the labor be
of the body or of the mind. The fundamental law recognized no
difference between the poet and the peasant, and it was said that
there is no consideration for the inviolability of property which is
not applicable as well to the mental labor of the poet as to the
physical labor of the peasant. It was sought to distinguish them
in this, that property, the result of manual labor, is corporeal;
that of mental labor without material substance. A mere intellec-
tual creation, composed of ideas, conceptions, sentiments and
thoughts, is. an invisible, intangible creation of the mind com-
municated by language and that, as material substance is an essen-
tial attribute of property, there can be no property in intellectual
labor. This, on the other hand, was declared to be erroneous
because, it was said, materiality was not essential to the identity
of a thing and that if identification can be determined, it matters
not whether the thing be corporeal or incorporeal; and that such
identification was possible is manifest, since the work of one poet
or author is easily distinguished from that of another. It was a' 3o
urged that corporeal possessions perish, while intellectual creation
is immortal.
The second theory assumed the existence of literary property
before publication, but that it was lost by publication; that while
the author had right to his work remaining in manuscript, by its
publication he abandoned it to the public. Against this contention
it was urged that there can be no abandonment of property with-
out consent of the owner, and that implies an intention to abandon;
that the author does not agree to abandon or to transfer his literary
property to the public by its publication; that he simply gives the
perpetual use of his work for a certain consideration, but that the
public has not the right by multiplication of copies to render the
work worthless to the owner. The contestants, however, said
that there was a strong analogy between literary production and
invention and that as the latter is clearly a monopoly, the former
must be and is only therefore protected by statute and not by
common-law. This reasoning, however, was repudiated by so
great an authority as Sir William Blackstone, who declared the
argument illogical and unjust.
The third contention assumed common-law property in published
works, but asserted its destruction by the statute. This rested
upon the construction of the statute. It is unnecessary to present
the legal argument advanced upon the one side or upon the other
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of this contention. It is sufficient to say that three of the four
judges of the King's bench decided that the common-law right
of property was not taken away by the statute, and that in the
House of Lords, the ultimate tribunal, six of the twelve judges,
counting Lord Mansfield, were of the same opinion. But the
decision of the House of Lords, as I have said, by vote of six
to five-Lord Mansfield abstaining from voting-was to the effect
that the common-law right of property in a published work was
destroyed by the statute and no right of property in a publication
thereafter existed except by force of and under -the statute.
This has since been the law of England, although its soundness
has received the protest of such learned jurists as Lord Compbell
and Mr. Justice Coleridge.
I have thus given a brief history of the conflict waged upon
this subject in the courts of England. One will observe that this
question of such great interest and moment to all engaged in in-
tellectual labor, was determined and settled in England by a vote
of six to five. If Lord Mansfield had not been influenced by an
over nice sense of delicacy and had voted according to his convic-
tions. the decision would by reason of an evenly, divided court,
have been the other way. This fact demonstrates that the law is
an exact science. And this fact also leaves one at liberty to make
up his mind which contention is correct, since the former "lords
of creation" to whom was confided the duty of judgment, were
unable to agree with respect to it.
It is perhaps well to note here that the act was drafted, pro-
moted and procured to be passed by authors and booksellers in
their interest; and their action was suicidal, for amid all the
judicial differences to which it gave rise, there was always a ma-
jority of the judges in favor of the view that but for the statute
an author was entitled to perpetual copyright. This is only another
illustration of the truth that an act of the legislature is not always
a sovereign remedy, and is often mischievous. In this instance it
proved a veritable boomerang for authors, but in the interest of
the public in general many reasons could be suggested why per-
petuity of copyright is not desirable.
The Constitution of the United States grants to the Congress
"power to promote the progress of science and useful arts by se-
curing for limited times to authors and inventors exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries." By a recognized
84
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rule of construction, since we borrowed this doctrine of protection
from the mother country, we took it with the construction of the
law which had been there declared; so that it must be held to be
the law of this country that an author by publication of his work
has only such property right in it as is reserved and secured to
him by the acts of Congress enacted in pursuance of the Consti-
tution, and such has been declared to be the law by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Wheaton vs. Peters,
8 Peters, 591, decided in the year 1834. It is proper to say that
this decision, like that of the House of Lords of England, rests
upon the divided opinion of the judges, four agreeing to the
judgment of the court, two dissenting and one being absent and
not voting. The minority opinion declared that-"The great
principle on which the author's right rests is that it is the fruit
or production of his own labor, and that labor by the faculties
of the mind may establish a right of property as well as by the
faculties of the body." This division of the judges fortifies the
conclusion before suggested that the law is an exact science.
Whether for right or for wrong, it must now be taken as settled
law that the Constitution of the United States by the clause re-
ferred to, and the statutes passed by Congress in pursuance
thereof, do not affirm an existing right in the author, but created
one, and that such right can only be upheld when the provisions
of the law have been complied with and for the limited time
prescribed.
The avowed object of the constitutional provision is to pro-
mote the dissemination of learning by inducing intellectual labor
in works which will promote the general knowledge in science
and useful arts. It sought to stimulate original investigation,
whether in literature, science or art, for the betterment of the
people that they might be instructed and improved. The produc-
tion, to come within the protection of the law, must therefore
be innocent and not injurious to the public peace or morals. It
must be original and be a material contribution to useful knowl-
edge. It must not be seditious, libelous, immoral or blasphemous.
It need not necessarily be of literary merit, for many produc-
tions lacking this quality constitute valuable additions to useful
knowledge and are sources of information valuable to the public.
The production, however, must have some value as a composi-
tion, sufficiently material to lift it above utter insignificance and
worthlessness.
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The Congress has frequently acted upon the subject of copy-
right, extending from time to time as seemed desirable the sub-
jects which are deemed to come within the constitutional pro-
vision. The protection which originally was limited to maps,
charts and books, has been extended to include books, pamphlets,
maps, charts, dramatic and musical composition, engravings, cutsi
prints, photographs or negatives thereof, paintings, drawings,
chromos, statuary and models or designs intended to be per-
fected as works of art.
The Constitution authorizes the securing to authors of the
exclusive right to their writings. This word "writings" is, how-
ever, to receive a liberal interpretation; it is not limited to the
actual script of the author. The word means the literary pro-
duction of the author and includes all forms of writing, printing,
engraving, etching, etc., by which the idea in the mind of the
author is given visible expression. This is illustrated by the
Sarony case, III U. S. 53, where copyright protection was
allowed for a photograph-and this before the act of Congress
which specified photographs. A photograph is in a sense a purely
mechanical reproduction and in that sense is not within the pro-
tection of the Constitution; but the selection and arrangement
of costume, drapery and other accessories of the photograph, the
pose of the person, the arrangement of the subject so as to
present graceful outlines, the arrangement and disposing of light
and shade, the suggesting and evoking the desired expression,
were held to be the products of the photographer's intellectual
invention of which he was the author, and the exclusive use of
that product of the mind was held to be secured to him by the
law. The author is he who really represents, creates or gives
effect to the idea, fancy or imagination, whether in writing, print,
picture or statue.
Can the copyright law be extended to include mere advertise-
ments? In England it undoubtedly can, for they are included
within the act, and the parliament of Great Britain is unlimited
in power. There it was held that a catalogue of curios and rare
books offered for sale by a bookseller was within the protection
of the statute; not, however, as an advertisement, but because it
contained original matter, the product of intellectual labor. So
also in Grace vs. Newman, Law Rep. i9, Eq. 623, a stone and
marble mason was protected in the sale of a volume of litho-
graphic sketches of monumental design from cemeteries and
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church yards, the court observing that it was full of interesting
matter which would often be referred to and consulted as well
by persons who contemplated their own death as by others in
reference to those who have died. It was a collection of designs
of artistic merit, tending to the cultivation of artistic taste. The
ruling would probably be sustained in this country upon the
ground that it was a book of reference or of art. In a case
decided in the year 1882, the court of England expressly ruled,
however, that a mere advertisement, whether in writing or by
picture, is within the protection of the statute. Maple vs. Inmor
Army & Navy Stores, 21 Ch. Div. 369.
In this country, however, it must be borne in mind the federal
government, unlike that of Great Britain, is one of delegated
powers, the Constitution of the United States being a grant of
power and not a limitation upon power. By the constitutional
provision upon the sfibject of copyright, the power lodged with
Congress is not unlimited. It is restricted to the promotion of
the progress of science and the useful arts. The protection was
intended for the encouragement of learning and not of mere
industry unconnected with learning and science. The sciences
are of a fixed, permanent and durable character and do not
comprehend the fluctuating and fugitive advertisements which
change daily and are but of temporary use. The article entitled
to protection must have by itself some useful purpose other than
as a mere advertisement or designation of the subject to which
it is attached. The statute is not designed as a protection to
traders in the particular manner in which they may shout their
wares. Higgins vs. Kluppel, 14o U. S. 428; Mott Iron Works
vs. Clow, 82 Fed. 316.
By the statute, copyright may be acquired only by a citizen of
the United States or a resident therein, or by a citizen or subject
of a foreign state or nation when such foreign state or nation
permits to citizens of the United States the benefit of copyright
on substantially the same basis as its own citizens, or when such
foreign state or nation is a party to an international agreement
which provides for reciprocity in the granting of copyright, by
the terms of which agreement this country may at its pleasure
become party to such agreement. Copyright is granted for a
term of twenty-eight years with a right to a further term of
fourteen years upon compliance with the terms of the statute
within six months before the expiration of the first term. This
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provision for the extension of time inures in the case of the
death of the author to the benefit of his widow or children. 'I o
entitle an author to copyright, he must before publication of his
work deliver or mail to the librarian of Congress a printed copy
of the title of his book or *other article, or a description of the
work, if it be a work of the fine arts; and within ten days after
the publication of the work he must deliver to such librarian two
copies of the book or article, or a photograph of the work if it
pertain to the fine arts. The fee is but a trifling sum. The work
published must have inscribed on it the fact that it is copyrighted
or the author cannot maintain his action for piracy.
An interesting question arose whether the publication of a
work in serial form in a magazine before the deposit by the
author of the title as required by the statute, would invalidate a
copyright subsequently procured. It was ruled that the statute
did not mean that such publication should be in completed form
only, but that it should not be given out to the world until the title
of the work was deposited as required; that such construction
did not prevent the serial publication of any work, but merely
required the deposit of the title prior to such serial publication,
and that serial publication without such deposit of the title
amounted to a dedication of the work to the public. This ques-
tion arose in the case of Oliver Wendell Holmes' work, "The
Autocrat of the Breakfast Table," published first serially in the
Atlantic Monthly and afterwards copyrighted as a book. Holmes
vs. Donohue, 77 Fed. 179, decided 1896; Holnes vs. Hurst, 174
U. S. 82, decided 1899. The requirement that the title shall be
deposited before publication cannot be tortured into meaning that
deposit of the title subsequent to publication is sufficient. The
requirement of the law is plain and simple and as the author
can have no right except through the law, he must comply with
its provision. It, however, affords me gratification to be able to
state that Oliver Wendell Holmes and his family received the
benefits of the law and reaped large profits from the sale of his
work for a period of thirty-seven years before anyone questioned
his title to the copyright or sought, contrary to good morals, to
deprive them of the exclusive right to the mental labor of that
distinguished author.
The literary world is now laboring to procure uniformity of
copyright law among all civilized nations so that the rights of
an author shall not be circumscribed by the boundaries of the
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country of which he is a citizen, but shall be international and
coequal with the boundaries of civilization. International agree-
ment is the one thing now needed to fully protect the author and
to prevent international piracy. To this desirable end, interna-
tional conventions have been held-notably one at Berne-anl
publicists and jurists as well as authors are agreed that it is just
and desirable. It is to be hoped that these efforts may not prove
unavailing and that at no distant day the civilized nations of the
earth will in respect to this matter be ranged upon the side of
honesty and justice in the proper protection of the property of
the brain.
I have thus sought to give, as succinctly as I could, a com-
prehensive insight into the laws of copyright. One will observe
that the law affords great protection to the labor of the brain,
fostering intellectual effort, preserving the fruits of that labor
to its creator and protecting him from literary piracy: Under
such encouragement it is not surprising that literature and art
have received fresh impetus, stimulating all worthy efforts to
promote learning, to develop science and to cultivate the arts, re-
sulting in the increase of the general fund of human knowledge,
the cultivation of taste, the development of the arts, and to the
betterment of mankind.
